continuous, no such condition exists. That is, for any causal model in which Z is an instrument there exists another model, indistinguishable from the first, in which Z is not an instrument. 3 Baker's Fig. 1(d) , for example, where Z is in an instrument, cannot be distinguished (by measuring X, Y , and Z) from one to which an arrow Z → Y is added, thus rendering Z no longer an instrument. This demonstrates that an instrument, Z, cannot be defined probabilistically in terms of P (X, Y, Z).
One may attempt to escape this demonstration by defining an instrument relative to a triplet (X, Y, U ) rather than a pair, where U is a "confounder" (as in Baker's Fig. 1(d) ). This, too, must fail. First, the concept of "confounder" is causal, and defies all definitions in probabilistic terms [2, Ch. 6; 3] . Second, consider Fig. 1 (e) to which we add an arrow Z → Y . The newly formed graph is "complete" (i.e., all pairs are adjacent) and, therefore, can generate any probability distribution P (x, y, z, u) whatsoever. In other words, this complete graph, in which Z is not an instrument, can emulate any model that characterizes Z as an instrumental , such as the one in Fig. 1(d) . We conclude, again, that an instrument cannot be defined in probabilistic terms, regardless of whether it is defined relative to a pair or a triplet.
Similar demonstrations can be used to show that "M -bias," and in fact any concept invoking the notion of "bias" cannot admit a definition in probability theory. 4 This raises the question why Baker's analysis may give one the impression that probability theory in itself can explain M -bias and bias amplification. The answer is, Baker's analysis merely re-validates (not "explains") known algebraically probabilistic aspects of these phenomena, while the conclusions rely crucially on causal information that is kept out of the analysis. Appendix A, for example, merely shows that, given a probability function compatible with the graph X ← Q → U ← R → Y , conditioning on U would create dependency between otherwise two independent variables, X and Y . This follows directly from d-separation, a probabilistic tool that has nothing to do with causation or with "bias." To show that conditioning on M creates bias one must give causal interpretation to the M -graph, and invoke the truncated product interpretation of interventions [2, pp. 22-24]; probabilistic interpretations in themselves remain insufficient.
The litmus test for classifying M -bias as "probabilistic" or "causal" is clear and crisp; given a joint distribution P (X, Y, U, W, Q, R) can we determine (from P alone) whether adjustment for U produces bias on not? If the answer is yes, we have a probabilistic question on our hand; if the answer is no, and we find ourselves needing the causal graph to decide, we conclude that the question is not probabilistic but causal. In our case, the latter holds -we must examine the causal graph before deciding whether adjustment for M would introduce bias.
The same applies to Baker's treatment of Simpson's paradox; Appendix A does not provide a proof that adjustment on U is not appropriate; no proof based solely on probability theory can deal with the question of "appropriateness" or decide that adjusting for U in Fig. 1(a) is appropriate while in Fig. 1(c) it is not appropriate.
Such distinction comes from the causal information conveyed by the arrows, not the conditional independencies conveyed by those arrows; all attempts to explain the paradox without invoking causation have failed (see [2, Ch. 6; 4] ).
Lastly, I am surprised by Baker's claim that the "paired availability design does not fit into a causal graph framework" (Baker, Section 5). The description of the "paired availability design" given in this paper, is formulated in terms of "principal strata" -a counterfactual framework that fit perfectly and, in fact, is subsumed by the causal graph framework (see [2, Ch. 8; [5] [6] [7] ). A structural causal model represents all counterfactuals that may possibly be defined among the variables in the model [8] and, therefore, subsumes any design based on these counterfactuals.
5
The symbiosis between graphs and counterfactuals is much tighter than what Baker's paper presents, and has led to major advances in problem areas such as mediation analysis, external validity, heterogeneity and missing data (see http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/csl papers.html).
